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There are many areas of the tax system in which substantial concessions are 
made, or appear to be made, to certain forms of activity. Such concessions, or 
reliefs, can cost the government money in just the same way as direct public 
expenditure programmes. The recognition of this fact is important, but we argue 
in this paper that measuring the revenue forgone as a result of a given tax 
treatment is not straightforward. In some cases the figures published are easily 
and frequently misinterpreted, or may be flawed in themselves. 
We take as an example for this paper the tax treatment of private pensions in 
the UK. Private pension funds account for around one-third of all personal 
wealth in the UK, and hold around 40 per cent of all UK equities. Private 
pensions are complex and long-lived financial contracts, and their tax treatment 
is often described as generous. Increasing the level of taxation imposed on them 
is often suggested as a way of raising substantial amounts of money to finance 
particular projects or reforms. In Section II we therefore describe the system of 
taxation for private pensions. Section III looks at the concept of a tax 
expenditure in more detail and outlines a methodology for arriving at coherent 
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measures of the cost associated with the tax treatment of private pensions, and 
Section IV applies this methodology to a representative sample of individuals. 
Section V concludes. 
II. THE TAXATION OF PENSIONS IN THE UK 
Since it is with tax expenditures on private pensions that we are primarily 
concerned, a brief outline of the tax system as it affects them is given here. In 
particular we concentrate on defined benefit occupational pension schemes.
1 
In simple terms, pensions in the UK are taxed as deferred pay. Contributions 
to pension funds, whether by employee or employer, are exempt from tax, there 
is no tax on fund income and pensions in payment are taxed in full. It is worth 
dwelling briefly on the implications of this type of tax treatment. It confers a 
post-tax rate of return on saving equal to the pre-tax rate of return. Hence faced 
with this regime an individual earning 100 can either choose to spend now, 
paying 25 of tax (assuming he is paying tax at a marginal rate of 25 per cent) and 
consuming goods worth 75, or save now and consume goods next year. Assume 
an interest rate of 10 per cent. He can save the full 100 of his earnings, because 
pension contributions are tax-free. The 100 will earn interest of 10, leaving a 
fund of 110 at the end of the year, because fund income is tax-free. If the 
individual retires at the beginning of the next year he can withdraw 110, paying 
tax at 25 per cent, implying a tax bill of 27.50 and a net withdrawal of 82.50, 
which is 10 per cent more than 75. The pre-tax rate of return is the 10 per cent 
interest rate, the post-tax rate of return is the reward for deferring consumption 
for one year as a percentage of the deferred consumption, which is also 10 per 
cent (7.50÷ 75.00). The equality of pre- and post-tax rates of return is the central 
feature of the form of tax treatment frequently referred to as Expenditure Tax 
treatment, because tax is only due when income is consumed rather than when 
earned (see Meade Committee (1978), Kay and King (1990) and Fry, Hammond 
and Kay (1985) for further discussion). 
While this brief description of an ideal Expenditure Tax treatment sums up 
the tax treatment of private pensions quite well, in practice of course the 
situation is somewhat more complex. The main deviation from the type of 
neutrality described lies in the possibility of a tax-free lump sum being taken on 
retirement. 
The 1970 Finance Act defines the conditions under which a (defined benefit) 
pension scheme can be allowed the status of an ‘exempt approved scheme’ and 
hence benefit from the tax treatment described above. The Board of the Inland 
Revenue retains extensive discretionary powers to give approval to the large 
number of schemes which do not actually satisfy the criteria laid down in the 
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Act. The main restrictions on approval relate to the maximum level of benefits 
which limit the annual pension to two-thirds of final salary and the tax-free lump 
sum to 1.5 times annual salary. In general, firms will only allow three-eightieths 
of final salary to be taken as a lump sum for every year of contributions, making 
1.5 times final salary only after 40 years. The taking of such a lump sum reduces 
the allowable pension by an amount dependent on the size of the lump sum 
taken. A man at 65 will typically see his annual pension reduced by one-ninth of 
the value of the lump sum, a woman at 60 will typically have her pension 
reduced by one-eleventh of that amount. 
Subject to these conditions, the contributions by both employee and employer 
to a fund are fully deductible from income for tax purposes. Contributions by an 
employer are not treated as taxable benefits in kind of the employee, and can be 
set against corporation tax like other labour costs. The income and capital gains 
of the fund are entirely free of tax, while pensions in payment are taxable in full, 
though a lump sum on retirement up to 1.5 times final salary is tax-free, as are 
any similar provisions for payments on death in service. 
A further limit on the allowable generosity of private pensions was 
introduced in the 1989 Budget. It imposed a 60,000 limit on pensionable 
earnings for new schemes or new entrants to schemes. This was to be indexed by 
the Retail Price Index and presently stands at 75,000. 
III. MEASURING THE TAX COSTS OF PENSION SCHEMES 
As we have seen, private pensions in the UK attract a number of important tax 
reliefs. Partly as a result of this relatively favourable tax treatment, occupational 
pension funds take an extremely important part of total savings in the UK. It is 
thus often felt that the cost of taxation support for pension schemes is very high; 
that is, the fact that pensions are treated relatively favourably
2 for tax purposes 
means that less tax is raised than would have been raised if this favourable 
treatment were to be withdrawn. These costs are often referred to as tax 
expenditures.  
The idea of a tax expenditure is based on the fact that support for a particular 
activity through the tax system imposes demands on public revenue in exactly 
the same way as does explicit public expenditure. This sounds simple but there 
may be serious difficulties with the concept. In particular, the assessment of a tax 
expenditure in some circumstances may require some concept of what the tax 
system ought to be if there were no tax expenditures. This is a problem when 
estimating tax expenditures on pension schemes where there is no obvious 
bench-mark of comparison. 
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1. Issues in Measuring Tax Expenditures 
According to Willis and Hardwick (1978), a 
tax expenditure is an exemption or relief which is not part of the essential structure of the 
tax in question but has been introduced into the tax code for some extraneous reason — 
e.g. in order to ease the burden for a particular class of taxpayers, or to provide an incentive 
to apply income in a particular way, or perhaps to simplify administration. The term is used 
to cover, not merely specific exemption but also gaps in the charge as a result of which 
receipts ... are not subject to tax. 
This definition of tax expenditures points to the most obvious problem with their 
measurement: before they can be measured we must have some clear idea of the 
‘essential structure’ of the tax system. In some areas, that may be relatively clear, 
but in others it is not, and the taxation of savings in general is an area where 
there is considerable disagreement over the essential structure of the tax system. 
If we believe that the tax system requires all income to be taxed when it accrues 
after adjustment for inflation (that is, we favour a Comprehensive Income Tax), 
we will argue that owner-occupied housing, private pensions, Personal Equity 
Plans (PEPs) and Tax-Exempt Special Savings Accounts (TESSAs) confer large 
tax expenditures, that life assurance contracts and direct holding of equity are 
taxed roughly correctly, and that interest-bearing savings suffer a negative tax 
expenditure.
3  If we believe that income should be taxed only when it is 
consumed (that is, we favour an Expenditure Tax), we will argue that owner-
occupied housing and pensions confer small tax expenditures, that PEPs and 
TESSAs are taxed precisely correctly, that life assurance contracts and direct 
holdings of equity have moderate negative tax expenditures, and that interest-
bearing savings suffer a very large negative tax expenditure. These arguments, 
very appropriately, point us back to the realisation that the crucial debate is over 
the aims and structure of the whole tax system as it affects saving. 
Even if some agreement is reached over the essential structure of the tax 
system, the task of calculating tax expenditures remains difficult. The most 
frequently quoted estimates of tax expenditures on pension schemes relate to the 
amount that would be raised in any one year if, instead of being tax-relieved, all 
contributions, investment income and payments were to be taxed at the marginal 
tax rate of the contributor. The Inland Revenue published each year until 1990 a 
table of the estimated cost of tax reliefs calculated on this basis. The relevant 
estimated costs for 1989–90 are shown in Table 1. 
But there are clear problems with interpreting these measures of the costs of 
tax reliefs as tax expenditures as defined above. In particular, one cannot 
reasonably add together the costs of relief on contributions and investment 
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income to produce a total cost. To tax both these and to maintain the taxation of 
pensions in payment would imply a substantial degree of double taxation. To go 
back to our earlier example of an individual earning 100 and either spending 75 
now or saving, the amount available to spend in one year if spending was 
deferred would be less than 75. Tax would be charged on the contributions, 
leaving only 75 to save; tax would be charged on the 7.50 of interest which 
would be earned, leaving only 5.625. The fund would stand at 80.625 at the end 
of a year. If this was withdrawn and taxed, the individual would pay around 
20.16 and have only 60.47 left to spend, nearly 15 less than he could have spent 
one year earlier. In everyday terms it would be like saving in a bank out of 
taxable income, having the interest payments taxed while in the bank and then 
paying tax on the whole of any money withdrawn. This absurdity emphasises the 
need for some bench-mark of comparison. 
TABLE 1 
Tax Expenditures (1989-90) Calculated by the Inland Revenue 
Relief Estimated  cost 
(£ million) 
Pension contributions  5,700 
Investment income of pension schemes  4,400 
Lump-sum payments to pensioners  1,000 
Source: Inland Revenue Statistics 1990. 
Other problems are also important. Firstly one of the reasons for the 
importance of the occupational pension sector is the fact that it has a tax-
privileged status. If this tax-privileged status were to be reduced or withdrawn, 
the amount of saving done through pension schemes might fall. The amount of 
tax then raised would depend on individuals’ reactions to the change in regime 
and what happened to any money no longer being saved through the pension 
scheme. 
Secondly, it is important to take account of the fact that pension contributions 
today will eventually lead to pension payments in the future and tax may be 
levied on these payments. Not only does this mean that pension rights held today 
will result in extra taxes in the future, but that the more tax-advantaged pension 
contributions are today, the more tax revenue is likely to be raised eventually. In 
measuring the cost of tax reliefs, then, it is important to look at the issue over an 
extended period — for any individual, this period would have to stretch from his 
first contribution to the last pension payment at his death. This clearly raises a 
number of problems relating to the measurement of the present value of incomes 
spread over a long period, and the rate of discounting to use, among others. Occupational Pensions 
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However, to avoid rather spurious snapshot estimates, some attempt has to be 
made to overcome these problems. 
Finally, as has already been stressed, any estimate of the exchequer costs of 
tax relief requires some assumption about what alternative method of saving 
would be used if pension schemes were not available or lost some of their tax 
privileges. In practice, a range of alternative vehicles for saving exist into which 
pension contributions might be diverted, the most obvious alternatives being 
PEPs and TESSAs, both of which provide tax-free investment income (subject to 
some fairly stringent conditions, particularly in the case of TESSAs), but which 
do not attract tax exemption for contributions. Ordinary building society 
accounts, by contrast, offer neither tax-exempt contributions nor tax-exempt 
interest payments. Of course, none of these forms of saving is directly 
comparable to pension schemes which offer benefits only on retirement and 
guaranteed annual incomes from retirement until death, whenever that might 
occur. These other forms of saving are more flexible in that they can be accessed 
before retirement if desired, and can only provide a guaranteed income from 
retirement if they are used to buy an annuity. 
A number of issues have been raised, then, regarding the tax cost of pension 
schemes. The first important conclusion is that one must look at the cost over the 
whole lifetime of a contributor, otherwise the costs are overestimated because no 
account is taken of extra tax revenue raised when the contributor receives 
income in retirement. Secondly, it is necessary to use some other form of saving 
as a bench-mark of comparison for costs. If some tax relief is available 
elsewhere, the government cannot expect to raise all the tax apparently forgone 
if all the tax advantages of pension schemes are abolished. A final issue, which 
we shall not pursue in detail here, relates to the degree to which saving through 
pensions would be substituted into other forms of saving as opposed to being 
used for immediate consumption. 
2. Possible Methodologies 
The above discussion gives some indication of the direction in which one would 
want to go in measuring tax expenditures on pensions. A workable methodology 
remains to be found. 
The first point to become clear is that the figures produced by the Inland 
Revenue and reproduced in Table 1 are not useful as estimates of tax 
expenditures on pension schemes. They take account of none of the problems 
associated with measuring tax expenditures which have been considered. It is in 
fact rather hard to think of any useful purpose to which these figures might be 
applied. 
In fact, the Inland Revenue, recognising the problems inherent in this way of 
measuring tax expenditures, has produced new estimates on a different basis 
(Inland Revenue, 1991). This takes the existence of unapproved schemes as a Fiscal Studies 
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bench-mark for comparison. In unapproved funded schemes, employee 
contributions are paid out of taxed income and employees are chargeable to tax 
under Schedule E on any payments made to the scheme by the employer, 
although the employer’s contributions qualify for a deduction as a business 
expense. The income and gains of funds are chargeable to tax, usually at the 
basic rate. All benefits can be taken as a tax-free lump sum, though benefits in 
the form of an annual pension would be taxable. 
The Inland Revenue then uses this as a bench-mark with which the approved 
schemes can be compared. Thus a total cost of relief for funded approved 
schemes is then calculated by summing the tax reliefs on contributions by 
employees and employers and on funds’ investment incomes and then taking off 
tax liabilities on pensions in payment in the year in question. 
This takes account of some problems mentioned above, particularly in 
subtracting the tax in payment from the total of tax reliefs and thereby taking 
account of the fact that tax-relieved payments to schemes result in tax payments 
eventually. However, it still suffers from some problems. By taking tax on 
pensions in payment at the present time from the reliefs currently being enjoyed 
by the contributions and investments, current flows are measured but some of the 
dynamics of the situation are lost. If what we want to know is the present value 
of the costs over the lifetime of the investment, it would be preferable to estimate 
what tax payments would be made on the pension eventually earned by the 
contributions now being made. In an occupational pension system in 
equilibrium, this would not matter, but at a time when funds are still building up, 
the cost of tax relief will be overestimated. To see this, consider the introduction 
of a new pension scheme. Initially there will be tax costs associated with 
contributions and investment incomes but there will be no offsetting tax receipts 
from pensions in payment. But the expected flow of tax receipts from the 
pensions once they are in payment ought to be taken into account. 
Perhaps more importantly it is not clear why unapproved schemes should be 
used as a bench-mark for comparison. They offer a tax treatment essentially the 
same as that for building society accounts. It is unlikely that much money 
currently contributed to approved schemes would be invested under such 
conditions were the present tax reliefs to be withdrawn, since there are many 
more favourably treated savings vehicles available. 
Knox (1990) tries to overcome some of the problems outlined by examining 
in detail the position of a typical employee under a set of assumptions about 
earnings, earnings growth, rates of return on investment, life expectancy and so 
on. In doing this, he compares the tax payments to the government over the 
period from the first contribution until death that would be made under three 
different savings methods — a pension fund, a PEP and an ordinary interest-
bearing bank or building society account. The cost to the government of the 
relief for the pension scheme can then be shown as the difference between the 
tax that would be received from equal saving (equal in the sense of equal cost to Occupational Pensions
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the employee) in the pension scheme and through either of the other savings 
methods. This allows an estimate of the cost of the tax-privileged status of the 
pension scheme, for an individual over the period of application, to be made 
relative to the other forms of saving. This cost can be expressed in pounds at 
present value or as a percentage of the accumulated pension benefit. 
This method yields a number of interesting results, not least confirming the 
belief that the estimated cost to government depends to a large extent on the 
bench-mark used for comparison and on whether or not extra tax to the 
government after retirement is included in the calculation. The estimated cost 
also differs quite significantly according to exactly what assumptions are made 
about, for example, contribution rates, interest rates and inflation rates. 
This basic methodology is clearly useful, but suffers from a number of 
problems if a realistic assessment of the level of the tax expenditures is required. 
The most important of these is that the results are sensitive to the actual 
composition of occupational pension fund membership. The assumptions made 
include ones regarding the sex, income, contribution rate and marital status of 
the contributors, as well as ones regarding future inflation rates and so on. To 
reach a more reliable estimate of the cost, one would want to apply a similar 
methodology to actual individual data which would give an accurate picture of 
the characteristics of people contributing to pension schemes and the amount 
contributed. 
IV. THE COSTS OF PENSION TAX RELIEFS: A REPRESENTATIVE 
MODEL 
An attempt is made here to model the costs of the tax advantages enjoyed by 
occupational pension schemes, using data on actual individuals who are in such 
schemes. Data from the 1986 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) are used for this 
purpose and the sample of those appearing to be in an occupational pension 
scheme is taken. Their earnings are then projected back to the point at which 
they entered the labour market and forward to the point at which they will leave 
the labour market. This earnings information is used to predict the amount 
contributed to pension schemes and the amount received in pensions by each 
individual. 
Use is made of econometric work by Disney and Whitehouse (1991) which 
allows occupation- and industry-specific earnings profiles for each man in the 
1986 FES to be estimated. These individual earnings profiles are then combined 
with information on real earnings growth in the past — and predicted real 
earnings growth at 2 per cent per year into the future. This allows us to produce 
an individual-specific level of real earnings for each year between labour market 
entry and retirement for each man in the 1986 FES who is in an occupational 
pension scheme. Fiscal Studies 
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We take somebody to be in an occupational pension scheme if either they are 
recorded in the FES as making superannuation contributions or the level of their 
National Insurance contributions is such that they appear to be contracted out of 
SERPS.
4   The combination of these two factors in determining scheme 
membership allows us to distinguish both those who are in contributory pension 
schemes (those with recorded superannuation payments) and those who are in 
non-contributory schemes (those without superannuation payments). On this 
basis, 86 per cent of our sample of scheme members appear to be in contributory 
pension schemes and 14 per cent in non-contributory ones; these compare with 
figures of 87 per cent and 13 per cent recorded by the 1990 NAPF Annual 
Survey of Occupational Pension Schemes (p. 6, Section 2.3.1). Grossing up the 
numbers to population totals gives a total number of occupational pension 
scheme members of around 10.5 million, very close to the actual number of 
scheme members. 
It is on the basis of this information that the rest of the analysis proceeds. It 
clearly suffers from a number of problems. Firstly, we can only proceed on the 
basis of those currently contributing to a scheme, ignoring those who have rights 
to occupational pensions whilst not at present making any payments. Secondly, 
we cannot tell which of those in our sample will have interrupted working 
careers through unemployment or ill health at some point in their working life. 
Women, in particular, are likely to have significant gaps in their working lives, 
making their lifetime earnings profiles very hard to predict. The only way in 
which we are able to take account of this is by assuming that some women are 
likely to stop contributing to pension schemes a number of years before the 
pension becomes payable. Finally, an assumption has to be made about the level 
of real earnings growth into the future. For our base run, we assume 2 per cent 
annual real earnings growth. 
Estimating the Costs 
On the basis of these data, the total costs of the various tax reliefs associated 
with private pensions are estimated using a methodology similar to that used by 
Knox and outlined above. First, however, the reliability of the original data may 
be tested by estimating the annual cost of tax relief on employer and employee 
contributions in exactly the same way as was done by the government in Inland 
Revenue Statistics until 1990. That is, for all of those in a scheme, their marginal 
tax rate is multiplied by the level of their contribution to estimate a cost for 
employee contributions. The level of contribution is taken to equal recorded 
superannuation payments. For employer contributions we take the average 
contribution rates recorded in the NAPF annual survey, namely 8.1 per cent of 
earnings to contributory schemes and 13.3 per cent to non-contributory schemes 
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(p. 6, Section 2.3.2). Grossing up the sample to reflect the size and composition 
of the population as a whole, and bringing the data forward to the present day by 
multiplying costs based on the 1986 data by the rate of price increase since that 
time, results in an estimated annual cost of tax relief for employee contributions 
of around 1.8 billion and for employer contributions of around 4 billion. These 
compare with published estimates in the 1990 Inland Revenue Statistics of 2.2 
billion and 3.5 billion respectively. We appear to have a slight underestimate of 
the cost of employee contributions and a slight overestimate of the cost of 
employer contributions. However, the total cost is remarkably similar to 
published estimates. 
To make cost estimates using our different methodology, further assumptions 
need to be made. In particular, assumptions need to be made about level of 
benefits received, length of time spent in the schemes, age at retirement, life 
expectancy, future inflation rates and discount rate. The assumptions we use in 
our base analysis are set out in Table 2. For simplicity, we allow just two 
retirement ages, either 60 or 65. It is assumed that two-thirds of men retire at 65 
and one-third at 60, while two-thirds of women retire at 60 and one-third at 65. 
These proportions correspond approximately to the spread of retirement ages 
shown in the NAPF survey (Section 3.4.1, Table 52). Again for simplicity, we 
assume all receive one-sixtieth of their final salary as a pension per year of 
pensionable service, this being by far the commonest basis of pension 
calculation. Hence someone in a scheme for 40 years would receive two-thirds of 
final salary as a pension. 
TABLE 2 
Assumption for Base Analysis 
Male life expectancy  74 
Female life expectancy  80 
Male retirement age  ⅔ at 65, ⅓ at 60 
Female retirement age  ⅓ at 65, ⅔ at 60 
Real discount rate  1.7% 
Benefit level  Final salary ×  Years in scheme ÷  60 
Average time spent by men in scheme  26 years 
Average time spent by women in scheme  20 years 
Average time between leaving scheme and 
retiring (men) 
7½ years 
Average time between leaving scheme and 
retiring (women) 
15 years 
Inflation rate  6% 
When considering the availability of tax-free lump sums up to a maximum of 
1.5 times final earnings, the pension payable is reduced by a fixed amount Fiscal Studies 
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according to age. The available lump sum itself depends upon length of service, 
since companies are not generally willing to give lump sums up to the maximum 
permissible for tax purposes if this uses up all or most of the available pension. 
In the majority of schemes, a lump sum of three-eightieths of final salary for 
each year of scheme membership is payable. Thus only somebody who had been 
in a scheme for 40 years would be eligible to receive the full tax-free lump sum 
of one-and-a-half times final earnings. Receipt of a lump sum reduces the 
available pension by fixed amounts according to age and sex. 
Account is taken of the fact that most people will not spend the whole of their 
working lives in a pension scheme by varying the number of years spent in a 
scheme such that the average length of time spent in a scheme works out at 
approximately 26 years for men and 20 years for women. These figures are close 
to, though slightly above, the average scheme membership lengths recorded by 
Bone et al. (1992, Table 6.28). Although no account is taken of the possibility of 
moving between schemes, account is taken of the fact that a number of scheme 
members, particularly women, are likely to stop contributing to the schemes 
before retirement. This is reflected in the average length of time between leaving 
the scheme and retirement, and the effective reduction in benefit that this usually 
implies. 
It is important to note that here we are examining defined benefit pension 
schemes. This has a number of implications making comparisons with other 
savings media, which tend, of course, to be of a defined contribution type, a little 
difficult. As described above, the level of pension is determined as a multiple of 
final salary. It is assumed that this pension will be paid until death, but falling in 
value by 1 per cent per year to take account of the fact that, on average, pensions 
are not fully indexed. The Government Actuary’s Department report for 1983 
finds that, on average, pensions in payment were increased by 80 per cent of the 
level of inflation. With inflation at 6 per cent, this underindexation is roughly 
equivalent to a 1 per cent fall in the real value of the pension paid each year. The 
NAPF survey also reveals that around half of occupational pensions are 
‘integrated’ with the state scheme. In general this means deducting the level of 
the basic state pension from the earnings on which the pension is calculated. 
Given that the contribution pattern that we are assuming will remain constant 
as a proportion of earnings, the effect of having the actual level of pension 
determined ex ante is that the rate of return on investment has to be calculated to 
allow the funds to fulfil their obligations. That is, the rate of return on 
investment is not a parameter but is calculated from other parameters. That it 
should work out at a plausible rate is another test of the model. Given our base 
assumptions, it works out at 1.7 per cent per annum, which is also used as the 
discount rate shown in Table 2. 
The life expectancies for men and women shown in the table are life 
expectancies at age 40, the average age of those in our sample, rather than life 
expectancies at retirement. In the calculations, account is also taken of Occupational Pensions
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inheritance of pensions by widows. They are assumed to inherit half of their 
husband’s pensions. 
We compare the tax effects of occupational pensions with those of Personal 
Equity Plans (PEPs) and ordinary interest-bearing savings accounts. For 
purposes of comparison, we assume that on retirement, savings made through 
one of these media are used to purchase an indexed annuity. Depending on the 
rate of interest as they do, the annuity rates are also worked out by the model 
rather than given as parameters. 
The income accrued under the three alternative savings media is calculated 
based on the contributions made over the period in question and the different tax 
treatments of the contributions and investment income for each form of savings. 
The sums involved are enormous. Around 780 billion accumulates as the pension 
fund, 560 billion from the PEP and 340 billion in the ordinary savings account. 
All the figures are in current prices. They are the sum of the totals contributed by 
each individual and the interest thereon over the whole period for which each 
individual is making contributions. As such, they represent the situation in a 
fund at the end of a period in which people had been contributing and no 
pensions were being paid. These funds are then used to pay the pensions or 
annuities of those who have contributed. In this sense, we are treating our sample 
of people of varying ages as if they were a single cohort. The same process 
applies when calculating the tax costs. In this case, costs and benefits from each 
year after the initial year of entry into the labour market are deflated by the 
discount rate to the year of entry. To make all the figures comparable, these 
figures for costs and benefits are then brought forward to the present date using 
the same discount rate. In other words, all the figures presented are in present-
value terms. 
Table 3 shows the total fund accrued under each form of saving and the total 
tax payments under each scheme where tax payments under the pension scheme 
are set at zero. Hence the tax appearing under the PEP could alternatively be 
considered as the level of tax relief on contributions enjoyed by the pension 
scheme. The tax payment in respect of the savings account represents the tax on 
contributions and on investment income. Again the numbers over the full period 
are rather too big to be meaningful. Dividing the tax numbers by the average 
number of years between entry into the labour market and death gives an 
estimate of the present values of the annual amounts of tax paid. The choice of 
period by which the total should be divided is important. Extending the period to 
death rather than retirement allows comparisons to be made with income flows 
after retirement and for all annual costs to be put on a consistent basis. Starting 
at labour market entry rather than entry into the scheme is clearly necessary, for 
otherwise the annual cost would increase if people made the same level of 
contributions but over a shorter period. Overall, since we are looking at our 
sample over the period from their labour market entry to their death as a single Fiscal Studies 
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cohort from the occupational pension point of view, the whole period is the 
appropriate one for use in annualising costs. 
TABLE 3 
Some Pre-Retirement Income Flows 
£ billion 
  Pension PEP  Savings  account 
Eventual fund  780  560  340 
Total tax  0  140  290 
Annual tax  0  2.4  4.9 
 
The average period of time between labour market entry and death is 59 
years. Division by this number gives an annual present value of tax of 2.4 billion 
from the PEP and 4.9 billion from the savings account. That is, looking just at 
the income flows before retirement, the tax reliefs applicable to occupational 
pension schemes are worth 2.4 billion per year relative to a PEP or 4.9 billion 
relative to an ordinary interest-bearing savings account. 
As we have already seen, however, to gain a meaningful estimate of the tax 
costs of pension schemes requires one to look at the post-retirement situation in 
addition. Table 4 shows the levels of pensions and annuities paid under the 
different regimes and the amount of tax payable on each. The situations under 
which a lump sum, of the size described earlier, is taken and is not taken are both 
shown. 
TABLE 4  
Post-Retirement Income Flows 
  Pension PEP  Savings  account 
Average lump sum per person  £17,000  £17,000  £17,000 
Average initial payment per person       
Lump sum taken  £4,600  £3,700  £1,600 
No lump sum  £6,100  £5,500  £3,400 
Total tax paid       
Lump sum taken  £75 bn  <£0.5 bn  <£0.5 bn 
No lump sum  £115 bn  <£0.5 bn  <£0.5 bn 
Annual tax       
Lump sum taken  £1.3 bn       
No lump sum  £2.0 bn       
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Table 4 contains a number of results. It demonstrates how different can be 
one’s pension entitlements depending on the tax treatment of one’s investments. 
With a lump sum taken, only a third as much is received annually in retirement 
by somebody who invested money in a building society as by someone who 
invested, at the same cost to himself, in a pension scheme. The figures also give 
some indication of the tax costs associated with the tax-free lump sum available 
from pension schemes. If the maximum lump sum is taken, then the total tax 
payments under the pension scheme amount to some 75 billion, as against tax 
payments of 115 billion if no lump sum is available. This indicates a total cost of 
around 40 billion. Over the average period from entry into the labour market to 
death, this indicates an annual cost of tax relief on the lump sum of around 2/3 
billion per year compared with a situation in which this tax relief is not 
available. 
Tax receipts after retirement for the three possible savings media are shown. 
If a lump sum is taken, the receipts from annuities bought with savings from 
PEPs or building societies are negligible, while the tax paid on money from 
pension schemes is quite substantial at 75 billion. This rises to 115 billion if no 
lump sum is taken, compared with under 0.5 billion for the PEP and building 
society standards of comparison. Perhaps surprisingly, this implies that without 
the tax-free lump sum, the post-retirement tax received from the pension scheme 
less that received from the PEP annuity wipes out most of the extra tax received 
from contributions to a PEP. This occurs despite the fact that the income from 
the annuity bought with the PEP is taxable. The very small amount of tax 
actually paid results from the fact that the capital element of the annuity is not 
taxed, and from the importance of the tax-free personal age allowance. 
Returning to the tax system as it is (i.e. including the tax-free lump sum), 
putting the tax costs in Tables 3 and 4 together allows an estimate to be made of 
the total cost of tax reliefs for occupational pension schemes relative to the two 
other savings vehicles. 75 billion is raised from the pension schemes themselves, 
about 140 billion from the PEP bench-mark, and 290 billion from the savings 
account. This indicates a cost of around 65 billion relative to a PEP and 215 
billion relative to a savings account. Dividing again by 59 to give annual costs 
results in costs of about 1.1 billion and 3.7 billion per annum respectively. 
These annual numbers mean something rather different from the annual costs 
presented in Inland Revenue Statistics and elsewhere. For one thing, they are 
present values of a flow of funds over a prolonged period rather than single-year 
snapshot estimates. Secondly, they take account of the full build-up of pension 
funds and so look at the effects on future tax revenues of all current 
contributions rather than current contributions and current revenues. In this sense 
the numbers quoted do not give an answer to questions regarding this year’s 
current cost or this year’s revenue forgone. What they do give is an estimate of 
the present value of costs and benefits which have already accumulated and 
which are still to accumulate. Fiscal Studies 
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The costs calculated are much lower than those presented in Inland Revenue 
Statistics which shows costs of 7.7 billion in 1989–90 and 8.4 billion in 1990–
91. Part of the reason for these different results comes from the difference in the 
questions being asked. Another reason for the difference may lie in the low 
nominal rates of return we have assumed (6 per cent inflation plus 1.7 per cent 
real return). In those years, both inflation and real interest rates were higher; 
nominal interest rates remain higher than those assumed. As explained, the 
reason for our assumed real rate of 1.7 per cent was to ensure that the funds’ 
assets equalled their outgoings. If, instead, an interest rate four percentage points 
higher had been assumed, the annual cost relative to a building society account 
would have risen by 1 billion. Secondly, because the Inland Revenue figures 
subtract current tax revenues from benefits in payment from pre-retirement tax 
expenditures, they will show lower post-retirement tax receipts than a 
methodology which calculates tax on future (higher) benefits. 
The results given, if they are to be taken as indicative of the cost of tax 
reliefs, must assume, of course, that in the absence of occupational pension tax 
reliefs, the same amount of saving would be done. The tax effects of this saving 
disappearing altogether and the money being spent instead of saved can easily be 
seen, however, for this would be equivalent to the money raised pre-retirement 
from the PEP, i.e. the tax on contributions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The actual costs of the current tax treatments of private pensions and other assets 
are often measured in terms of tax expenditures. We have examined this concept 
and shown that it is only meaningful within the context of a bench-mark against 
which expenditures can be measured. Then the size of the tax expenditure 
depends on the bench-mark in use. Furthermore any estimate of the cost of such 
tax expenditures must take account of transactions over the whole period from 
the first contribution to the last payment. 
Developing a microdata-based model, an actual annual present-value cost of 
tax relief on pensions of just over 1 billion relative to a PEP and one of under 4 
billion relative to an ordinary savings account were estimated. These are rather 
lower than figures frequently mentioned. This is partly because the question we 
look at is slightly different, in that our figures refer to the present value of future 
costs and benefits calculated on the basis of current contributions, while 
published statistics tend to offer only a snapshot. The figure relative to the PEP 
bench-mark is probably the more accurate costing, as savings now made through 
pensions would be likely to move to the next best asset if the tax reliefs on 
pensions were to be removed. The same cost would apply if, instead of saving in 
PEPs, individuals reacted to a change in the tax regime for occupational pensions 
by not saving that money at all. Occupational Pensions 
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